Interview with John Crawley, IRA Volunteer from 1980–2007
The following is an interview which I was pleased to conduct with John Crawley, a.k.a. “the Yank”, who served as a Volunteer in the Irish Republican Army between 1980 and 2007.
Q: You joined the IRA in 1980. What motivated you to join the IRA?
A: It was a gradual awakening. There was no epiphany. I was always interested in politics and history and my personal belief system and inner sense of conviction led me to the conclusion that the British government has no right to claim jurisdiction in any part of Ireland. I don’t have the type of personality that can believe this and stand idly by and do nothing about it. Furthermore, I grew up in the American republic so was inclined to a republican outlook from an early age. The United States has a myriad of cultures, ethnic groups, religions and other differences yet its citizens give allegiance to a united national republic. India with a population of 2.1 billion has two thousand ethnic groups and fifteen official languages yet is one united republic. Ireland, with a population half that of London has two principal traditions yet is a partitioned country principally because a minority tradition is underwritten politically, financially, and militarily by a foreign government. Republicans have believed for over two hundred years that breaking the connection with England is key to uniting Irishmen of whatever persuasion under one joint civic identity. We recognise Ireland has two distinct communities not two distinct nations. Ireland was always considered one nation under British rule. We believe Ireland must be remain one nation under Irish rule. I joined the IRA to help break the connection with England and achieve this.
Q: You spent time stationed in South Armagh, which functioned as a de facto liberated zone, pretty much under IRA control. What tactics and factors do you think enabled the IRA to have such control in South Armagh?
A: I was never a member of the South Armagh Brigade but had been in that area for meetings and over the years would have had dealings with a number of their volunteers on various projects. Many IRA command areas produced brave and committed men and women but South Armagh had a particular concentration of high calibre operatives. South Armagh got off to a good start from the beginning of the Troubles by having leaders who set the example and led from the front. The actual number of Volunteers was very low. South Armagh stressed quality over quantity at all times and it paid off for them. Their biggest asset was not being penetrated by British intelligence. At least not during the height of their military operations in the late 70’s and 1980’s. Consequently, they were able to maintain operational security to a degree unsurpassed in any other IRA brigade area. They also had the support of a substantial portion of the local population. Both active support in helping directly with providing resources and intelligence and passive support in people not reporting IRA activity they may have spotted or suspected. The South Armagh IRA were careful and precise in their operations. They never accidentally killed innocent civilians so locals who passed them information could be confident any military activity undertaken as a result of that intelligence would be professional and focussed and not endanger their families or neighbours.
Q: In your estimation, at the time of your service, how much popular support did the IRA enjoy, and which areas in particular were its biggest strongholds, on both sides of the border?
A: Popular support for the IRA depended largely on the area and the political context of the time. In the occupied Six Counties it was naturally concentrated in nationalist and republican areas as opposed to unionist areas. In urban settings, like Belfast and Derry, it would have been strongest in working class estates. While border areas in the South of Ireland tended to have concentrations of support in places such as North Louth, North Monaghan and East Donegal there was a sophisticated IRA support network throughout the 32 Counties of Ireland.
Q: One allegation commonly made towards the IRA is that it was a “terrorist” organization. Can you explain why this is not the case, and in what ways the IRA’s tactics differed from groups such as ISIS, the Ku Klux Klan and al-Qaeda, who I think can be described as terrorist organizations? For instance, what measures would the IRA take to avoid civilian loss of life?
A: For the most part the term ‘terrorist’ is an expression of political abuse. It is used to label political enemies as criminals who engage in violent, irrational, and illegal behaviour. While I do accept the term terrorist is valid for groups who deliberately target innocent civilians the Irish Republican Army, as a matter of strict policy, never did so. In the unfortunate cases where innocent civilians were killed by IRA actions it was the result of poor intelligence, incompetence and other unintended factors. Of course, this is no comfort to those who lost loved ones as a result of these tragic mishaps. It is important to bear in mind that although it was incumbent on IRA volunteers to be careful and apply due diligence to avoid inflicting unintended casualties, none of these unfortunate incidents would have occurred if Britain hadn’t invaded and occupied Ireland in the first place.
Q: One volunteer who I am aware you knew was Jim Lynagh. Jim Lynagh studies the works of Chairman Mao Zedong in prison, and later advocated a Maoist military strategy, the strategy which has worked well in China, Vietnam, Nepal and elsewhere, to liberate Ireland. What is your opinion on this Maoist military strategy that Jim Lynagh and others proposed?
A: I know Jim studied revolutions and revolutionaries from many conflicts. I’m not sure how much the Maoist narrative holds up though. The IRA attacked police barracks throughout Ireland during the War of Partial Independence from 1919–1921. It was a tactic that long pre-dated Chairman Mao. The IRA attacked Royal Irish Constabulary infrastructure throughout the country and by June 1920 456 RIC barracks had been evacuated and 40 were damaged or destroyed. Jim would have been aware of this. Driving the constabulary from an area removes the eyes and ears of the enemy to a substantial degree although the enemy would still have informers in the locality. Policing is the cornerstone of British counter-insurgency strategy in Ireland. It is the anchor upon which normalisation and criminalisation is secured.
Q: In the earlier years of your service, Sinn Féin and the wider Republican Movement advocated a program named Éire Nua, which envisaged a federal Ireland with a participatory democratic system, what is your view on this program?
A: I would not be a fan of Éire Nua. If the British were to disengage from Ireland and this program was the only template it would not be a red line for me, I would go with it. But, in my view the idea of four provincial parliaments (the Federal system) is not suited to our context. Ireland is too small a country. I think it would add an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy but my principal objection is that I believe we need a strong national parliament as an institutional frame of reference around which to build a national identity as citizens of an all-Ireland republic.
Q: In 1981, the H-Block Hunger Strikes captivated the attention of Ireland and the world. What were you doing around the time of the hunger strikes and what was your reaction to them, and your analysis of them?
A: I was a young IRA volunteer during the hunger strikes. In fact, I attended Bobby Sand’s funeral. There is a photo of me standing among the crowd behind the firing party that fired the volley over Bobby’s coffin. It was pure coincidence I happened to be standing there when the shots were fired as I had no idea the firing party was going to give their salute at that spot. The Hunger Strikes made an enormous emotional impact on all of us. For some volunteers it hardened our determination to pursue Irish freedom at all hazards, for others it opened up the vista of political careers and opportunities that could be achieved on the back of public support for the hunger strikers.
Q: In the 1990s, the IRA stepped up its campaign in London, especially targeting the financial sector. Do you judge this tactic to have been an effective one, and can you explain this tactic in more detail?
A: The tactic of targeting the financial sector could have been effective had it been done for strategic reasons rather than as a tactic to strengthen the negotiating position of the Provisional leadership at talks that most volunteers on the ground did not know were taking place. Two explosions at Bishops Gate and the Baltic Exchange caused more economic damage than the ten thousand explosions in the north of Ireland during the whole course of the Troubles. The potential effect that strategically focussed operations such as these may have had were frittered away when they were used as negotiating capital to achieve an internal settlement on British terms as opposed to an overarching strategy to achieve a British government withdrawal from Ireland.
Q: What tactical errors do you think the IRA made during its campaign at the time you were a volunteer?
A: The principal errors that I perceived were a lack of professional military training in the use of small arms, a complete lack of tactical training at unit level, and a lack of understanding of British military equipment and capabilities. There was too much emphasis on commercial car bombings which were not strategically focussed and had the most potential to endanger innocent civilians. Also, I would have liked to see fewer operations in the South of Ireland, such as kidnappings to raise funds, which put us in conflict with that state and alienated the population from us.
Q: Coming to a more theoretical angle, how would you describe the overarching philosophy of the Republican Movement?
A: The overarching philosophy of the Irish Republican Movement is to break any remaining constitutional connection with the United Kingdom and to forge a joint civic identity as Irish citizens in a national democracy within an all-Ireland republic. A republic based on political equality and social justice. To replace sectarian identity politics which were fostered, nurtured, and exploited by the British with an Irish national identity.
Q: Many, beginning in earnest with James Connolly and the Irish Citizen Army, view republicanism through a distinctly socialist, and often times Marxist lens. What are your views on socialist republicanism, and would you advocate the Irish Republic to be a socialist republic, as was the official line of the Provisional movement? Do you hope to see a socialist economic system in Ireland after it is liberated?
A: I would advocate any economic model which would bring an independent Ireland prosperity and social justice. I would not be dogmatic about socialism. A socialist republic was not mentioned in any of the early statements by the founding members of the Provisional movement who had split from the Marxist Official IRA. I believe the concept of a socialist republic (advocated by James Connolly) entered the Provisional IRA lexicon in the late 1970s with the rise of the Adams leadership. I believe that some leadership figures were genuine in achieving this ideal but others advocating for a socialist republic were far more motivated by Lenin’s concept of seizing state power through a revolutionary vanguard than the achievement of full freedom and social justice for the people of Ireland. They eventually ended the armed struggle in return for an internal settlement on British terms and many are quite wealthy from the cash injections, business opportunities and career paths that resulted from this. In accepting the British institution of the Stormont parliament, they settled for office as opposed to genuine power which remains in the hands of the British government by virtue of the parliamentary supremacy of Westminster. Ireland remains partitioned and Sinn Féin heartlands in West and North Belfast remain devastated by social deprivation, child poverty, high suicide rates and drug use. I see no republican or socialist achievements in any of this. Nor do I believe those achievements were key priorities for some personally ambitious leadership figures. Differentiating between those who call for a socialist republic and those who actually mean it is, I’ve found, nearly impossible.
Q: You were born and spent much of your childhood in the United States as a member of the Irish diaspora. In your opinion, do you think that the Irish diaspora has a role to play in the liberation of Ireland, and if so, what role is this? Also, what is the history of the diaspora’s role in the Irish Republican Movement?
A: By 1860, as a result of the Great Hunger of 1845–52, an Irish nation over a million strong lived in the United States — a nation irrevocably hostile to England yet beyond the reach of Crown jurisdiction and reprisals. The British were alarmed these Irish were learning bad habits, not least experiencing life in a democracy within an independent republic that had thrown off the shackles of British rule. Many Irish were prospering and amassing money and resources denied them in their native land. Furthermore, by the end of the Civil War, tens of thousands had received military training and combat experience. They would not ignore the injustices visited upon Ireland forever. An apprehensive British government concluded that the Irish people had to be shielded from what The Times of London called “the despicable ideas” inspired by “American democracy.” Since that time, Britain has invested massive resources into nurturing a loyal nationalist opposition to lure the people away from the republican ideal and divert and deflect Irish Americans from supporting that ideal — the establishment of an independent, sovereign all-Ireland republic. Irish Americans take a national view, as opposed to a unionist or partitionist view, of Ireland. The have a very important role to play, not only in funding republican causes, but in pressuring the British government. The British listen to views from Washington whereas they view Dublin with polite contempt.
Q: Officially since 1994, but according to many, unofficially since before then, the Provisional and Sinn Féin leadership have been committed to the so-called “peace process”, what is your analysis of this process, and the succeeding Good Friday Agreement? Also, despite the undeniable reduction in violence, do you judge the occupied six counties to be truly peaceful?
A: I support the peace but I am critical of the process. According to the Good Friday Agreement, if a border poll on Irish unity is called, the British government decides the poll’s wording and who qualifies to vote. Their parliament in Westminster must approve the final result. So, yes, a path to Irish unity has been outlined but simultaneously constrained by an intricate web of terms and conditions that London alone adjudicates. No Irishman, elected or otherwise, can call an Irish unity poll in Ireland. I do not look on the present peace as a genuine peace with justice but as a pacification measure brought about by Britain’s counter-insurgency apparatus. The root cause of violence in Ireland still exists which is Britain’s jurisdictional claims and its interference in our internal affairs.
Q: Lastly, why is it do you think that the British state and crown so desperately cling on to their presence in Ireland? It’s easier to look at their presence in somewhere like Iraq, and see that there is an obvious factor (oil and other natural resources) which explains their presence, which many cannot find in Ireland. So what is your analysis of why Britain clings on?
A: Powerful forces in the British political, military and intelligence establishments do not want to do anything that can be seen to be undermining the political and territorial integrity of the United Kingdom. Ireland is a massively important strategic landmass on Britain’s western flank. Britain’s nuclear submarine fleet based at Faslane in Scotland must navigate the narrow North Channel between ‘Northern’ Ireland and Scotland to reach the North Sea. Northern Ireland is part of NATO while Southern Ireland is not. The North of Ireland affords rapid access to areas of the North Atlantic vital to British defence interests, particularly the GIUK gap, a naval choke point between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. Russian ships and submarines must navigate this gap to reach the North Atlantic. Ireland has been rated as a place of vital strategic importance to Britain since Elizabethan times. Despite British government protests to the contrary it remains so.
